Timeline
Gemma Namey, Solicitor, Public Interest Advocacy Centre
The Public Interest Advocacy Centre has gained access to dozens of previously classified documents relating to Australia’s involvement in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The following timeline places these documents in chronological order.
2001
October 2001: Australian troops commence operations in Afghanistan.
2002
Late February/early March 2002: Operation Anaconda, Afghanistan.
25 Feb 2002: Chief of Defence Force (CDF) provides a brief to the Minister for Defence advising there is ‘no clear government policy on the handling of personnel who may be captured by the ADF on Operation Slipper’ (doc 74). CDF requests approval to seek US agreement to assist in the transport and detention of detainees caught by the ADF; detainees to remain under ADF supervision.
25 Feb 2002: Minister for Defence directs CDF to urgently request US assistance in detainee handling.
25 Feb 2002: CDF Admiral Barrie telephones US General Franks following Ministerial request. Option of having US forces present during coalition operations to secure formal responsibility emerges (it is unclear who suggests this option) (doc 55, 4).
27 Feb 2002: CDF emails General Franks confirming their earlier conversation that, wherever possible, US forces will be present during coalition operations to secure formal responsibility to the US for the treatment and status of captured persons (doc 55, p.4).
Feb-Mar 2002: Interim detainee policy issued to Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO) (Doc 55, p.4)
27 May 2002: Final comprehensive advice received from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department on US General Franks’ response regarding the treatment and status of detainees (doc 55, p.6).
June 2002: ADF issues its detainee policy for Afghanistan (doc 55, p.7).
June-July 2002: ADF planning for deployment to Afghanistan of a detainee handling capability (doc 55, p.7).
30 Aug 2002: CDF issues an amplification message on handling captives. It states that when Australian personnel are operating in support of US personnel, US personnel are to take custody of captured or surrendered Taliban or Al Qa’eda members. The CDF message includes advice about procedures to be followed when captives are taken by the ADF operating alone (doc 8A).
3 Oct 2002: Minute from CDF to the Minister for Defence enclosing draft Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS)/National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) submission for approval of current handling of captives and for a ‘contingency plan’ at a cost of $860,000 for Australia to deal with captives taken during solely Australian operations (doc 200).
Nov 2002: Draft NSC submission considered by SCNS (doc 200).
2003
5 March 2003: CDF requests approval from the Minister for Defence to negotiate prisoner of war/civilian detainee arrangements with the US and the UK for the planned conflict in Iraq (doc 93).
12 March 2003: Minister for Defence approves request to negotiate detainee arrangements with the US and the UK (doc 93).
18 March 2003: Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, commits troops to war in Iraq.
21 March 2003: Australian Defence Force personnel hold detainees on board HMAS Kanimbla (docs 97 and 184).
23 March 2003: Trilateral Arrangement on detainee handling is signed by US, UK and Australia at Camp As Sayliyah, Doha, Qatar (doc 97).
30 March 2003: CDF issues an implementing amplification message on handling captives (doc 55, para.1.40)
11 April 2003, 1:00pm: 20 Australian SAS and one member of the US armed forces detain 66 men, including four Iranians, in Ramadi, Iraq.
11:30pm: The SAS hands the 66 detainees over to the UK RAF.
12 April 2003: Sometime on this day, Tanik Mahmud, one of the 66 men detained by Australian SAS, ‘sustained a fatal injury’ and died while on board a UK RAF Chinook helicopter (Ian Cobain, ‘Iraq Deaths in British Custody Could See Military Face Legal Challenges’, Guardian.co.uk, 1 July 2010; Ian Cobain, ‘British Servicemen Suspected of Murdering Iraqi Civilians’, Guardian.co.uk, 12 September 2010).
12 May 2003: Brief given to CDF (prepared by Major General Gillespie) regarding problems with media reporting of the incident on 11 April 2003 and policy adopted during incident, namely that one US soldier formally captured the 66 men (doc 97).
June 2003: The UK RAF police commence investigation into Tanik Mahmud’s death.
June and July 2003: The first reports from Australian Defence Force personnel of abuse of detainees in Iraq.
June and July 2003: Australian Colonel Kelly’s situation reports (sitreps) advise that Amnesty International is unhappy with detainee treatment.
July 2003: The Australian military lawyer, Major George O’Kane, commences his deployment in Iraq, working in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Joint Task Force Seven in Baghdad.
7 July 2003: The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran sends a letter to Australia asking for the release of four Iranian detainees captured on 11 April 2003 (doc 182).
27 August 2003: Major O’Kane visits Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad to provide legal advice to the US Commanding Officer of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade on the legality of proposed interrogation techniques.
28 August 2003: Major O’Kane prepares a legal memorandum that concludes that the proposed interrogation techniques to be used at Abu Ghraib prison only ‘substantially complies with the Geneva Convention’.
October and November 2003: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits detention facilities in Iraq and produces two working papers that contain allegations of detainee mistreatment and abuse.
November 2003: Major O’Kane receives a copy of the ICRC October working papers on abuse.
November 2003: Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, visits Baghdad and meets Paul Bremer, US Administrator of Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq.
November 2003: Australian Lieutenant Colonel Muggleton reports concerns by an Iraqi Minister about abuses in detention.
4 December 2003: Major O’Kane visits Abu Ghraib prison to meet with US military 800th Brigade staff and raise the ICRC allegations with them.
17 December 2003: Major O’Kane visits Abu Ghraib prison.
24 December 2003: Major O’Kane’s letter, drafted on behalf of US Brigadier General Karpinski, in response to the ICRC October and November Working Papers, is sent to the ICRC regarding allegations of mistreatment.
2004
January 2004: Major O’Kane becomes aware that the US is keeping a detainee, Hiwa Abdul Rahmna Rashul, known as Detainee Triple X, hidden from the ICRC.
January 2004: Major O’Kane is instructed by the US Commander of the Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq to deny the ICRC access to nine detainees held in cell block 1A at Abu Ghraib prison.
2 January 2004: Major O’Kane visits Abu Ghraib prison. He gives a PowerPoint presentation to the US staff on the Geneva Conventions, ahead of the ICRC visit on 4 January 2004.
4 January 2004: Major O’Kane visits Abu Ghraib prison to facilitate a visit by the ICRC.
February 2004: Major O’Kane finishes his work at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate General in Baghdad.
15 February 2004: Lieutenant Colonel Muggleton advises the February ICRC report delivered to Bremer ‘is detailed, comprehensive and highly critical’.
29 February 2004: Major O’Kane’s successor reports on a meeting between senior officials, including Bremer, where Brigadier General Karpinski’s removal is discussed. It included ‘very serious allegations’ contained in the ICRC February report.
April 2004: UK RAF police investigators ask a pathologist if a post mortem is worth conducting on the body of Tanik Mahmud. The pathologist advised that the body would be too decomposed (Ian Cobain, ‘British Servicemen Suspected of Murdering Iraqi Civilians’, Guardian (online), 12 September 2010).
11 May 2004: Major O’Kane delivers a bundle of papers to Defence officials in Australia.
17 May 2004: The UK House of Commons is told an investigation into Tanik Mahmud’s death is ongoing (United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 17 May 2004, vol 421, col 663W (Adam Ingram); Severin Carrell, ‘New Allegations of Systematic Abuse of Iraqis by British Troops’ The Independent (online), 23 May 2004).
31 May 2004: Australian Senate Estimates hearing. Air Commodore Simon Harvey states, when asked whether Major O’Kane’s legal advice on interrogation techniques (dated 28 August 2003) concluded that the techniques were compliant with the Geneva Conventions, ‘I believe he did’.
31 May 2004: Minister for Defence refuses to allow Major O’Kane to appear before the Senate Estimates hearing.
1 June 2004: Senate Estimates hearing continues.
2 June 2004: Robert Hill states to Senate Estimates: ‘We don’t know of any suggestion that any prisoners in whose capture Australia was involved have been mistreated.’ (Evidence to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2 June 2004, 142 (Robert Hill, Minister for Defence))
2 June 2004: General Cosgrove and Defence Secretary Smith appoint an Iraq Detainee Fact-Finding Team (IDFFT), headed by Mike Pezzullo, to gather information about Australian involvement in detainee issues.
3 June 2004: Major O’Kane provides Defence with further documents.
7 June 2004: IDFFT interviews Major O’Kane as part of its investigation.
8 June 2004: A minute from General Cosgrove to Robert Hill advises that Tanik Mahmud died of a heart attack (doc 182).
10 June 2004: Minister Hill asks General Cosgrove to find out ‘urgently’ the results of the UK investigation into the death of Tanik Mahmud (doc 182).
10 June 2004: IDFFT conducts second interview with Major O’Kane.
11 June 2004: IDFFT report submitted to the Minister for Defence (doc 55).
16 June 2004: US media make public the detention of Detainee Triple X.
16 June 2004: Documents are tabled by the Department of Defence in the Australian Senate regarding detainee issues (Documents tabled in Senate 16.06.04).
17 June 2004: Senate Estimates hearing continues.
17 June 2004: Major O’Kane reports his knowledge of the detention of Detainee Triple X to Australian Brigadier Steve Meekin.
17 June 2004: General Cosgrove and Secretary Smith inform the Minister for Defence of Major O’Kane’s knowledge of Detainee Triple X.
6 July 2004: Australian Department of Defence official, Mike Pezzullo, writes to the US Ambassador informing him of Major O’Kane’s knowledge of Detainee Triple X, ‘for action as appropriate’.
Before October 2004: The Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) requests information from the Australian Embassy in Tehran about the four detained Iranians captured by Australian SAS on 11 April 2003 (doc 182).
8 December 2004: The UK RAF Deputy Provost Marshal declines Australia’s request for a copy of the UK investigation report into the death of Tanik Mahmud because, it says, the report is being held ‘for the purposes of criminal proceedings’ (doc 183).
Before 20 December 2004: A response to the Iranian MOIS is sent, stating that Australia did not detain the Iranians, as Australia was not the detaining power.
